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Men and Machines: The Psychological Impact of 
Gunboats on the Fort Henry and Donelson Campaign 
 
S. Marianne Johnson 
 
In an age of steam and industry, the ironclad 
warship represents the pinnacle of the Industrial 
Revolution. Although ironclads had been in existence in 
France and Britain in the 1850s, the American Civil War 
demonstrated the first time these gunboats were put to use 
in ship to ship warfare en masse.1 Today, ironclads are seen 
as one of the great technological achievements of the Civil 
War, but their conception and birth were surrounded by 
doubts and fears. Despite their intrigue, there has not been 
an in-depth study of the psychological effects of these 
revolutionary weapons on the men serving in and those 
opposing them. The closest study is Gary Joiner’s chapter 
on the timberclads Lexington and Tyler at the Battle of 
Shiloh.2 The bulk of the primary source material has come 
from the Official Records of the Union and Confederate 
Navies and the Official Records of the Union and 
Confederate Armies. Tracing the planning, building, and 
deployment of the first gunboats in the Western Gunboat 
Flotilla from late 1861 through the Forts Henry and 
Donelson campaign in February of 1862 explains how the 
ironclads came to be remembered as a symbol of Yankee 
power and invincibility.  
                                                          
1 Ervan G. Garrison, “Three Ironclad Warships—The Archaeology of 
Industrial Process and Historical Myth,” Historical Archaeology 29, 
no. 4 (1995), 27. 
2 Joiner’s chapter has largely served as the template for this piece. Gary 
Joiner, “Soul Stirring Music to Our Ears: Gunboats at Shiloh,” in The 
Shiloh Campaign, ed. Steven Woodworth (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 2009), 96-109. 
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 When Union General Winfield Scott introduced the 
Anaconda Plan, a design to isolate the Confederacy and 
squeeze it into submission, a crucial part of the plan was to 
control the Mississippi River and cut the Confederacy in 
half.3 To do so, the Department of the Navy began to 
consider the possibility of ironclad gunboats to conquer and 
control the river. The Department sent orders to Captain 
John Rodgers on May 16, 1861, sending him to General 
George McClellan’s Headquarters at Cincinnati “in regard 
to the expediency of establishing a Naval Armament on the 
Mississippi and Ohio rivers, or either of them, with a view 
of blockading or interdicting communication and 
interchanges with the states that are in insurrections.”4 The 
orders went on to state that this operation would be under 
the supervision of the Army and that Rodgers would be 
subordinate to McClellan.5 After communicating with 
McClellan, Rodgers bought three steamships to be 
converted into timberclads, the Conestoga, Lexington, and 
A. O. Taylor.6 Rodgers changed the name Taylor to Tyler 
due his personal aversion to President Zachary Taylor, 
viewed at the time as a part of the ‘Slave Power 
Conspiracy’ for his involvement in the Mexican Cession.7 
Rodgers purchased the ships for the “aggregate”8 price of 
                                                          
3 Gary Joiner, Mr. Lincoln’s Brownwater Navy: The Mississippi 
Squadron (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2007), 
9. 
4 Orders from Department of the Navy to Captain John Rodgers, May 
16, 1861. Rodgers Family Papers, Library of Congress. 
5 Orders of Dept. of Navy, Rodgers Family Papers. 
6 A timberclad was similar in structure to an ironclad, but as its name 
suggests, was armored with thick planks of timber instead of iron 
plating. 
7 Report, June 8, 1861, Rodgers Family Papers. 
8 Report, June 8, 1861, Rodgers Family Papers. 
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$62,000 and predicted that at least another $41,000 would 
be necessary to strengthen and outfit them for battle. 
 In addition to timberclads, a contract for ironclad 
gunboats, later to be known as city-class ironclads, was 
announced.9 In the summer of 1861, advertisements began 
to appear in newspapers across the North encouraging 
shipbuilders to submit their proposals for ironclads. The 
Boston Daily Advertiser announced on June 3, 1861 that 
shipbuilders should submit their proposals to the Navy 
Bureau of Construction by June 15.10 On July 27, The 
Daily Picayune in New Orleans reported that plans had 
been accepted and the gunboats would be built at 
Cincinnati.11 John Lenthall was the first to try to design the 
boats, but abandoned the project because of doubts. After 
withdrawing from the project, the task fell to his 
subordinate, Samuel Pook.12  
 In order to minimize vulnerability, Pook moved the 
single paddle wheel into the middle of the ship, inside the 
carapace. This provided decent protection at the expense of 
maneuverability; turning would be difficult. James 
Buchannan Eads won the contract to build seven ironclads 
using a layout similar to that of the timberclads based on 
Pook’s designs at $89,600 per ship, nearly four times what 
Lenthall had originally quoted. 13 In December of 1861, the 
                                                          
9 Joiner, Brownwater Navy, 25. 
10 “The New Gunboats,” Boston Daily Advertiser (Boston, MA) 
Monday, June 3, 1861; Issue 131; col. D. 
11 “The New Gunboats to be Built at Cincinnati for the United States 
Government,” The Daily Picayune (New Orleans, LA) Saturday, July 
27, 1861; col E. 
12 John D. Milligan, ”From Theory to Application: The Emergence of 
the American Ironclad War Vessel,” Military Affairs 48, no. 3 (July, 
1984), 126. 
13 Joiner, Brownwater Navy, 25; ORN 22:387; Milligan, “From Theory 
to Application,” 127. 
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Department of the Navy asked Congress for twelve million 
dollars for the ironclad program, more than the Navy’s 
entire budget for 1860.14 The Western Flotilla began its 
journey as a project with dubious success producing 
immense cost for its day.  
Despite disputes between the Army and Navy for 
who would pay these immense costs, preparations 
continued.15 The gunboats were to be one hundred and 
seventy-five feet long and fifty-five feet wide.16 They 
would have a draft of no more than four feet and the 
ironclads would be plated with sheets of iron two and a half 
inches thick and twelve to twenty-one inches wide joined 
with interlocking grooves.17 The whole project was 
expected to be completed in six to eight weeks. However, 
constructing the timber and iron warriors would be harder 
than first imagined. These gunboats were on the cutting 
edge of naval warfare, and new technologies meant trial 
and error. The boats were originally contracted to have two 
large staterooms for senior officers, ten smaller staterooms 
for junior officers, and two eight by ten foot mess decks for 
the enlisted men. As work got under way, however, the 
contractors quickly realized there simply was not enough 
room on the boats to fit everything. Instead of twelve total 
staterooms, the Conestoga could only be outfitted with 
eight rooms, each six foot square.18  Problems continued 
when it came time to arm the boats. Contractors found 
load-bearing beams where guns were supposed to go and 
                                                          
14 William Roberts, Civil War Ironclads: The U.S. Navy and Industrial 
Mobilization (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 19-
20. 
15 ORN 22:284-286. 
16 “The New Gunboats,” Daily Picayune, June 27, 1861. 
17 “Iron Plating,” Rodgers Family Papers. 
18 ORN 22:290-291. 
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had to find ways of working all the guns in without 
compromising the structure.19 Lt. Seth L. Phelps, who 
would eventually command one of the gunships, was 
seriously concerned about the work being done; he reported 
the joiner work was sloppy and expressed doubts about 
their success.20  
 Recruiting had been going on since the end of June, 
but Rodgers found considerable difficulty in getting men to 
enlist. This new project was uncertain from the start; no 
one knew yet how effective these boats would be in 
repelling enemy fire. Rodgers acknowledged that “the 
boilers and engines cannot be defended against cannon 
shot. We must take our chances.”21 No one knew exactly 
what would happen if a boiler was hit, and perhaps this 
danger kept men from enlisting.22 As the months went on, 
Rodgers desperately requested that Gideon Wells send him 
men, but none were to be had. Rodgers was forced to make 
do out in the west.23 The result was that the Western 
Gunboat Flotilla was crewed by a peculiar conglomeration 
of men who did not fit in anywhere else. Army transfers (or 
those who did not perform well in the infantry), rough 
riverboat pilots, and eventually former slaves and 
contrabands crewed the Mississippi gunboats.24 The crews 
were brash and undisciplined, brawling in the streets, some 
even dying of alcohol poisoning before shipping out.25 Lt. 
                                                          
19 ORN 22:290-291. 
20 ORN 22:292. 
21 ORN 22: 283. 
22 Michael Bennett, Union Jacks: Yankee Sailors in the Civil War ed. 
Gary Gallagher (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004) 
79. 
23 Letter from Secretary of the Navy Gideon Wells to Capt. John 
Rodgers August 23, 1861. 
24 Bennett, Union Jacks, 80. 
25 Bennett, Union Jacks, 80. 
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Phelps again expressed his concern, telling Rodgers that he 
was displeased with the quality of the pilots. 26 
 Uncertainties also arose over the time it took to 
complete the ironclads. The date by which the ironclads 
were to be completed came and went, and although 
unprecedented funds had been spent, it seemed there was 
never enough money or time to finally complete them. As 
Rodgers grew more and more impatient with the situation 
in the Cairo, St. Louis, and Mound City shipyards, Eads 
continued to assure him that it was only a matter of time 
until the ironclads were in the rivers. Finally, on November 
19, 1861, Eads declared the ironclads ready for service. The 
names of the six were Mound City, St. Louis, Pittsburg, 
Cincinnati, Benton, and Carondelet.27 In addition to these 
six, another vessel, the New Era, was converted to an 
ironclad and renamed the Essex.28 
 Once completed, the ironclads were anything but 
sleek and glamorous weapons of war. Squat and peculiar 
looking, they quickly gained the nickname “Pook’s 
Turtles”29 for their resemblance to the animal. Cramped, 
noisy, and dirty are words that suited the ironclads well. 
The only way to get to the pilot house was through two 
round ladders and very small port holes that only “active 
men”30 could fit through. The steam-powered engines 
worked around the clock causing constant rattling and 
noise. The vessels burned up to six thousand pounds of coal 
per day and belched black smoke, covering the vessels with 
a thick layer of black grime.31 Inside the ironclads, average 
                                                          
26 ORN 22:293. 
27 ORN 22:387. 
28 Joiner, Brownwater Navy, 27. 
29 Joiner, Brownwater Navy, 21. 
30 ORN 22:290. 
31 Bennett, Union Jacks, 82-83. 
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temperatures hovered around ninety degrees but would 
swell above one hundred on hot days, earning them another 
nickname, the “federal bake ovens.”32 
 The Western Gunboat Flotilla was born amidst a 
storm of doubt and obstacle. In August and September of 
1861, however, the storm began to abate. The completed 
timberclads arrived in Cairo, Illinois on August 16 and 
immediately were ordered to “make a demonstration down 
the River towards New Madrid.”33 As the boats began to 
operate, newspapers across the North began to sing the 
praises of the new gun boats. The North American & 
United States Gazette reported on September 26 that the 
gunboats were “floating and formidable shape…impervious 
to point blank shots—a ball striking them horizontally will 
glance off like a hailstone from a steep roof.”34 Two days 
later, the Daily National Intelligencer claimed that a test 
shot fired at one hundred yards did no damage to the iron 
and that instead, the ball itself broke in pieces.35 It is 
doubtful that a solid shot actually did break into pieces, but 
these reports had considerable psychological effects on 
soldiers and civilians alike. 
 Newspapers convinced Northern citizens they had 
an impenetrable weapon. They promised that “If the new 
gunboats now building near St. Louis, prove to be as 
invulnerable as expected, they will be one of the most 
effective…in whipping the rebellion. She can’t be sunk, 
                                                          
32 Bennett, Union Jacks, 82. 
33 Report from Capt. S.L. Phelps to Captain John Rodgers August 16, 
1861, Rodgers Family Papers, Library of Congress. 
34 North American and United States Gazette, (Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania) Thursday, September 26, 1861; Issue 25; col. I. 
35 “Western Gunboats,” Daily National Intelligencer, (Washington, 
D.C.) Saturday, September 28, 1861; Issue 15, 329; col. C. 
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burned, nor blown up.”36 The reporter was referring the 
New Era, later renamed the Essex. W.B. Coleman, acting 
Paymaster of the Tyler, wrote in late September, “It is 
astonishing what a change…has brought about in Public 
Opinion in regard to these Gun Boats, they are positively 
quoted now as the safety guards…”37 These praises only 
got louder as the boats continued to perform. On November 
7, 1861, General Ulysses Grant decided to try to take 
Belmont, just across the river from the Confederate 
stronghold at Columbus, Kentucky. Belmont proved too 
strong, however, and he was forced to withdraw. During 
the retreat, the Lexington and Tyler were able to put up a 
strong enough cover fire to allow all of Grant’s forces to 
evacuate. Both Grant and the naval captains recognized that 
the gunboats had served a valuable purpose; had it not been 
for the well-directed cover fire, Grant’s men probably 
would not have been able to pull out successfully.38 
Belmont impacted Grant profoundly; there he learned the 
importance of joint army-navy maneuvers that would 
characterize the rest of his fighting in the west.39  
 Reports from the gunboat captains took on a more 
hopeful tone after Belmont and even more so throughout 
December and January of 1861-62. Earlier that fall, 
Rodgers was replaced by Flag Officer Andrew Hull Foote 
for disagreeing with Major General John C. Fremont, but 
he left behind the beginnings of a fleet “worth more than 
                                                          
36 Bangor Daily Whig & Courier, (Bangor, Maine) Saturday, 
November 16, 1861; Issue 118; col. A. 
37 W.B. Coleman, Acting Paymaster U.S.S. Tyler, September 29, 1861, 
Rodgers Family Papers, Library of Congress. 
38 Captain Walke, Report on the Battle of Belmont, August 9, 1861, 
Rodgers Family Papers, Library of Congress; ORN 22:302. 
39 U.S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant (New York: Charles L. 
Webster & Company, 1885), 279-280; Joiner, Brownwater Navy, 36  
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5,000 soldiers.”40 The western crewmen were performing 
well and proving that they could make good artillerymen 
after all. Many were impressed by the boats’ ability to 
withstand heavy fire. Phelps’ report after the Battle of 
Lucas Bend was incredibly positive, reporting inflicting 
damage and receiving little in return.41  
 As the new gunboats commenced patrolling the 
rivers, Confederate horrors were only beginning. The rivers 
in the south cut straight to the core of the Confederacy, and 
the shallow gunboats were able to penetrate deeply into 
enemy territory with relative ease. This caused devastating 
psychological effects on Confederate citizens and soldiers 
alike. Appearing without warning, the gunboats represented 
a piercing type of invasion. Unlike the land armies, 
gunboats were incredibly mobile, seeming to materialize 
out of thin air and cause absolute terror in Confederate 
sympathizers. Images of vile Yankee gunboats preying on 
towns of old men and women supported the myth of the 
Vandal Yankee and infuriated Southern soldiers who could 
not effectively defend against them.42 The North American 
& United States Gazette reproduced a section of the 
Richmond Examiner on September 2 expressing relief that 
the South had finally started work on their own gunboats to 
combat Yankees “prowling through our rivers and hovering 
about our harbors.”43 Commander Strembel of the 
                                                          
40 ORN 22:319. 
41 ORN 22:324-325. 
42 John Beauchamp Jones, “Diary of John Beauchamp Jones, February 
1862,” in A Rebel War Clerk’s Diary At the Confederate States 
Capital, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co., 1866), 110. 
accessed via The American Civil War: Letters and Diaries Database; 
Bennett, Union Jacks, 85-86. 
43 “Southern Gunboats,” North American and United States Gazette, 
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) Monday, September 2, 1861; Issue 25, 
850; col. G. 
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Cincinnati claimed that two shots from the ironclad sent 
Confederate troops fleeing eight miles from the river.44 
 The Mississippi Gunboat Flotilla entered the Fort 
Henry and Donelson campaign as a weapon of terror. 
Although they had not yet fought a significant battle, both 
sides believed the ironclads to be impenetrable and 
undefeatable. For the North, this caused joy and 
confidence; for the South, fear and helplessness reigned. By 
early 1862, Grant had decided to attempt joint maneuvers 
to push up the Tennessee River and attained permission 
from Major General Henry Halleck to do so on February 1, 
1862. Halleck, unsure of the success of such a mission, 
carefully crafted his orders so that if the mission should 
fail, all of the blame would fall on Grant.45  
 Nevertheless, Grant moved forward with his plans. 
Fort Henry sat low on the Tennessee River in a poorly 
chosen spot. It did not help matters any that in his frenzied 
attempt to turn Columbus into the ‘Gibraltar’ of the West, 
Major General Leonidas Polk had diverted resources for the 
fort’s defense to Columbus. The result was an unfinished 
and sloppily built fort that could be enfiladed by three or 
four points on the opposite shore.46 Manned by 2,610 men, 
only a third of which were disciplined and properly trained, 
the fort was in bad shape by early 1862.47 Most of the men 
were armed with shotguns and hunting rifles, and one of 
the better armed regiments, the 10th Tennessee, was using 
“Tower of London” flintlock muskets that had last seen 
action in the War of 1812.48 As early as February 4, 
                                                          
44 ORN  22: 300. 
45 Joiner, Brownwater Navy, 39. 
46 ORN 22:556. 
47 ORN 22:557. 
48Jesse Taylor, “Memoir of Jesse Taylor”, in The Civil War Series 
Volume 1: Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (New York: Century 
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soldiers inside the fort could see “as far as the eye could 
see, the course of the river could be traced by the dense 
volumes of smoke issuing from the flotilla.”49 The soldiers 
in the fort knew attack was imminent.  
 In early February, 1862, Grant issued Field Orders 
No. 1 outlining the plan for the attack.  The first division 
under Major General John McClernand was to occupy the 
road between Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, twelve miles 
away on the Cumberland River, to cut off the escape route 
and prevent reinforcements to Fort Henry. Meanwhile, two 
brigades under Major General C. F. Smith were to move up 
the west bank of the Tennessee while the Third Brigade, 
Second Division advanced up the east bank. One company 
of the Second Division was detailed to Flag Officer Foote 
to serve as sharpshooters on the gunboats, who would 
approach the fort straight on and engage.50 
 At 10:20pm on February 6, the ironclads 
Cincinnati, Carondelet, St. Louis, and Essex approached 
Fort Henry four abreast. Behind them, the three timberclad 
gunboats formed a second line. Fire opened at 1,700 yards 
and steadily advanced to within 600 yards. 51 Within the 
fort, Confederate General Lloyd Tilghman knew his force 
could not drive back the gunboats and made the choice to 
send most of his force to Fort Donelson, a much more 
defendable position. Tilghman retained only the heavy 
artillery to perform delay tactics until the bulk of his force 
                                                                                                                    
Co., 1887), 370. Accessed via The American Civil War: Letters and 
Diaries Database.  
49 Taylor, Memoir, 369. 
50 General U.S. Grant, Field Orders No. 1, Rodgers Family Papers, 
Library of Congress. 
51 ORN 22:537; H.W. Wilson, Ironclads In Action: A Sketch of Naval 
Warfare from 1855 to 1895, Volume 1 (London: Sampson Low, 
Marston and Company, 1896), 62. Accessed via GoogleBooks. 
Men and Machines 
 
39 
 
could reach Donelson. In his after-action report, Tilghman 
estimated that the enemy gunboats had about fifty-four 
guns as opposed to the eleven in the fort.52 Tilghman 
managed to hold on until approximately 2:00 p.m.53  
 Tilghman’s report rings with language of 
desperation and hopelessness. After sending the bulk of his 
force to Donelson, Tilghman was faced with the choice of 
leaving his men or staying with them. Ultimately, he 
recognized what a psychological blow it would be to his 
men to abandon them. He decided to fight and stay, 
although his language makes clear that he had no hope of 
successfully fending off the ironclads. First, his twenty-four 
pounder gun exploded, killing or disabling every man at the 
piece. Next, the vent of his ten-inch Columbiad clogged 
and refused to reopen. One by one, he recorded the loss of 
each gun with growing anxiety. After firing for close to 
three hours, his men were exhausted. General Tilghman 
himself stepped in for an exhausted gunner at one of the 
thirty-two pounders.54 
  Reading Tilghman’s report leaves the one with the 
impression even the best gunmen the Confederacy could 
not oppose Yankee technology. Even if this is not accurate, 
the report is still a fascinating example of the Confederate 
dread of ironclads. One observer commented on the 
devastating effect the ironclads had on Confederate 
soldiers’ morale: “Our artillerists became very much 
discouraged when they saw the two heavy guns disabled, 
the enemy’s boats apparently uninjured and still drawing 
nearer and nearer. Some of them even ceased to work the 
32-pounder guns, under the belief that such shot were too 
                                                          
52 ORN  22:557. 
53 ORN 22:559. 
54 ORN 22:557-559. 
Johnson 
40 
 
light to produce any effect upon the ironclad sides of the 
enemy’s boats.”55 After the fort had surrendered, a captured 
Confederate gunner told a Federal sailor the Carondelet 
was the object of hatred and frustration among the gunners 
who, despite their well-aimed fire, could not disable her.56 
These incidents give the reader an image nearing futility; 
despite well-aimed Confederate fire, the ironclads just kept 
coming. Confederate accounts reveal the classic man versus 
machine dichotomy and give insight into the deeper 
psychological issues surrounding ironclads.  
 All told, the ironclads survived their baptism of fire 
quite well. The Carondelet and the St. Louis took six and 
seven hits respectively but reported no casualties. The 
Cincinnati took thirty one hits but reported only one killed 
and nine wounded. The Essex took fifteen hits, the last one 
piercing the boiler.57 In addition to the Confederate 
soldiers, the psychological impact of the gunboats on the 
Federal sailors who served in them cannot be overlooked. 
Believing the newspapers, many gunboatmen went into 
battle with a false sense of safety because they believed 
their gunboats were impenetrable.58 However, they were 
quickly disabused of these notions. Before an engagement, 
buckets of water and sand would be brought up to the deck. 
The water was for men to drink during combat; the sand 
was to absorb the blood. Seeing the sand forced men to 
confront their fears and the possibility of their injuries or 
deaths.59 The combination of smoke from the engines and 
guns resulted in smoke so dark and thick that sometimes a 
man could not see the man working the gun next to him. 
                                                          
55 ORN 22:604. 
56 ORN 22:545. 
57 ORN 22:539. 
58 Bennett, Union Jacks, 183-184. 
59 Bennett, Union Jacks, 185. 
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The darkness and almost suffocating effect of the smoke 
was disorienting and made men vulnerable to panic and the 
heat was so intense often men would strip to the waist and 
sweat so profusely they related it to rain.60  
 Unlike a land battlefield, inside an ironclad, there 
was nowhere to go to escape the carnage short of jumping 
into the river. The plating on the gunboats negated the 
impact of musket fire; instead, men saw the impact of large 
guns, ripping holes and sending splinters of wood and other 
debris into the crew and inflicting horrifying, gaping 
wounds. Men fought amidst the blood, limbs, and all other 
horrors that covered the decks.61 For Federal gunboatmen, 
combat became a waiting game. Some men found 
themselves counting the number of times shots hit certain 
areas of the boat, waiting for one to penetrate.62  Although 
safe for a moment, at any time a shot could hit just the right 
spot and turn the boat into a floating death trap. 
 The Essex exemplifies how one well-placed shot 
could turn a gunboat into a nightmare. The officers and 
designers knew the gunboats were weak around the boilers 
and engines, but there was little that could be done.63 The 
worst sound that could be heard on a gunboat in the 
Mississippi River was the sound of a shot hitting the boiler, 
a sharp crack followed by an intense rushing sound as 
scalding hot steam exploded in every direction. Steam from 
a boiler seared and boiled flesh and could even knock out 
teeth.64 When the shot entered the Essex, it decapitated 
Acting Master’s Mate S. B. Brittan before striking the 
boiler. Both pilots were immediately scalded to death and 
                                                          
60 Bennett, Union Jacks, 196. 
61 Bennett, Union Jacks, 189-190. 
62 Benett, Union Jacks, 188. 
63 ORN, 22:282-283. 
64 Bennett, Union Jacks, 192. 
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almost thirty men were soon after “writhing in agony”65 on 
the deck. Only about half of the wounded would recover.66 
Captain Porter dove through a gun port to escape the steam 
and was caught by Seaman John Walker, who held onto 
him with one arm and the boat with the other until help 
arrived.67 The men on the Essex saw comrades literally 
boiled to death and from inside the fort Confederate 
Captain Jesse Taylor could see men throwing themselves 
“wildly” into the water to escape the steam.68 
 After the fort fell, the timberclads Lexington and 
Conestoga were sent upriver to pursue any Confederate 
vessels they came across. They overcame eight Confederate 
vessels whose crews were forced to set them on fire before 
they could be captured by Union sailors. Included in the 
destruction was a load of iron destined for the Tredgar Iron 
Works and the destruction of over $100,000 of Confederate 
government property. At Florence and Tuscumbia, Federal 
troops broke into Confederate government warehouses and 
helped themselves to provisions but left civilian property 
alone.69 Southern sympathizers reacted to the loss in horror. 
The new Federal gunboats seemed invincible. The fight 
was relayed by the Daily Columbus Enquirer as an almost 
completely one-sided affair. “The fall of the first-named 
fort[Henry], we have no doubt, is due to the superiority of 
the guns of the Yankees—their gunboats, we presume, 
standing off, as at Hatteras, beyond the effective range of 
                                                          
65 Wilson, Ironclads in Action, 63. 
66 Wilson, Ironclads in Action, 63. 
67 Jay Slagle, Ironclad Captain: Seth Ledyard Phelps and the U.S. 
Navy, 1841-1864 (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1996), 160. 
68 Taylor, “Memoir of Jesse Taylor,” 372.  
69 “Federal Invasion-Gunboats Destroyed-Return of the Gunboats,” 
Daily Columbus Enquirer (Columbus, Georgia) February 15, 1862; 
Vol. 4, Issue 63, 3. 
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the guns of the fort, and at this safe distance pouring into it 
a fire which ultimately compelled its surrender or 
evacuation.”70 John Beauchamp Jones, a Confederate clerk, 
spun the invasion upriver as an attack on helpless, 
despairing women. As the boats continued their upriver 
raid, Confederates became terrified that the gunboats would 
be able to get into Alabama and Mississippi.71  
 For others, however, the gunboats had an interesting 
way of sorting out sympathies. Captain Phelps reported 
Unionists suddenly appearing on the river banks, telling 
stories of forced conscription, appealing to the gunboats as 
their liberators and begging them to stay. Often, the sight of 
gunboats would embolden Unionist citizens to unmask 
their sympathies, tearing apart the notion of the solid South. 
Phelps also reported that at least twenty-five young men 
clambered to the ironclads to enlist in the Union Army.72 
Once the gunboats departed, however, many of those same 
citizens hid those convictions because the gunboats were no 
longer there to protect them.73 The morale boost in the 
North was astounding. Flag Officer Foote was praised for 
his action and when the Cincinnati steamed into Cairo with 
Fort Henry’s Stars and Bars flying upside down under the 
United States flag, the city erupted into joyous cheering.74 
Some declared that the war would soon be over, but Flag 
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Officer Foote mourned the losses on the Essex and vowed 
that “never again will I go into a fight half-prepared.”75 
 The victory at Fort Henry was much more important 
for its psychological effect than for its actual military 
achievements. Although at first glance it appears that the 
ironclads were able to pull off a stunning, single-handed 
victory, two key factors worked hugely to their advantage. 
First, the horrible positioning of the fort beneath the water 
line resulted in flooding and allowed the ironclads to pour 
direct fire into it. Secondly, the bulk force of the garrison 
had already been sent ahead to Fort Donelson and only a 
skeleton force remained behind to cover the retreat. These 
factors produced a skewed vision of the ironclads as 
invincible weapons of war.76 The Macon Daily Telegraph 
glumly reported on the hard losses of the fort and the 
timberclad raid, misreporting that there was only one 
Federal casualty from the battle.77 
 The same newspaper, however, sought to minimize 
fear of the ironclads. One week after reporting on the hard 
losses, the Macon Daily Telegraph ran an article titled 
“Federal Gunboats Not Invulnerable.” The article 
misreported that the Confederates had been able to inflict 
one hundred Federal casualties and assured its readers that 
at least two shots had been able to penetrate the iron on the 
Essex and the Cincinnati. The article went on to predict that 
if the ironclads were to attack a better equipped, stronger 
fort, the outcome would be different.78 The article ran on 
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February 19, two days after Fort Donelson fell, but 
Donelson is never mentioned in the article and the 
prediction seems almost prophetic. 
 Meanwhile, preparations were being made inside 
Fort Donelson for the coming attack. Reporting on the state 
of Donelson’s defenses, Chief Engineer Lt. Colonel Gilmer 
felt confident in the fort’s ability to withstand a land attack 
but remained concerned about the gunboats.79 Brigadier 
General John Floyd, the commander officer of the fort, 
echoed similar sentiments. Floyd betrayed his anxiety, 
saying, “If the best information I can gather about these 
iron-clad boats be true they are nearly invulnerable, and 
therefore they can probably go wherever sufficient fuel and 
depth of water can be found, unless met by opposing 
gunboats.”80 Instead of waiting for orders, Grant 
capitalized on the opportunity and started immediately for 
Fort Donelson. Because the ironclads had performed so 
well at Fort Henry, Grant allowed them to attack without 
infantry support.81 This would prove to be a mistake. 
Donelson was much better outfitted, manned by about 
thirteen thousand troops, and sat on one hundred and 
twenty foot bluffs, starkly different from the lowlands of 
Fort Henry.82 On February 14, the ironclad assault was to 
begin in earnest. This was not the same fleet that had taken 
on Fort Henry; both the Essex and the Cincinnati were out 
for repairs. This time, the Louisville and the Pittsburg 
would join the Carondelet and the St. Louis along with the 
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timberclads Tyler and Conestoga.83 Foote himself was still 
not confident after the Essex boiler explosion and did not 
feel the Flotilla was ready to go into action again. Grant, 
however, disagreed, confident in their ability to deliver him 
another quick victory.84 The night before the assault, the 
two men met to discuss their disagreement. Although much 
of the conversation has been lost, Grant emerged cheerful 
and sure of his impending victory.85   
 On the morning of the assault, Grant and his staff 
assembled to watch the spectacular ironclads at work. 
Freezing rain and snow had reduced visibility to only a few 
yards.86 In order to prevent another Essex, the crew of the 
Pittsburg had stacked bags of coal, hammocks, and any 
other materials they could find around the boiler to protect 
it from direct fire.87As the ironclads steamed up to the fort 
with the timberclads in support, Confederate gunners 
managed to hold their fire until the ironclads got within a 
range of about four hundred yards and let loose a hail of 
fire simultaneously.88 Very quickly, chaos broke out as the 
Carondelet started the assault by sending harassing fire into 
the water batteries.  
 Instead of demolishing the batteries, the 
Confederate gunners were instead able to inflict serious 
damage to the point where some believed they had sunk 
Carondelet after she drifted downriver.89 The Carondelet 
had one of its rifled guns explode and was struck in the 
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wheelhouse, jamming the wheel and rendering the ironclad 
useless as she floated back down the river in need of 
extensive repairs.90 The official after action battle reported 
also noted that the Pittsburg had struck off his starboard 
rudder and the Tyler accidentally hit his casemate with a 
shell. The Carondelet reported no injuries after Henry, but 
after Donelson the crew had suffered forty-six wounded 
and four killed.91 
 The St. Louis also suffered, taking a shot through 
the pilothouse that penetrated one and a half inches of iron 
and more than fifteen inches of oak timber.92 Splinters from 
the timber wounded several, including Flag Officer Foote, 
who suffered an injury to the ankle.93 As the ironclads got 
closer, the fort’s batteries were able to fire directly onto 
their decks. Iron-plating on the decks was not very thick 
and the gunboats were mauled as shots penetrated the deck 
and wreaked havoc below. After only ninety minutes of 
firing, the ironclads were forced to retreat. The Carondelet 
alone sent one hundred and thirty-nine shells into the fort 
with minimal damage. Not a single Confederate gun in the 
fort was disabled and not one casualty was reported.94 
 The morale of the Confederate soldiers soared. 
After blowing off the smokestack of the St. Louis, one 
Rebel gunner reportedly shrieked out, “Come on, you 
cowardly scoundrels, you are not at Fort Henry!”95 
Brigadier General Gideon Pillow sent joyous telegrams 
declaring their success in the “fiercest fight on record” with 
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the ironclads.96 A portion of the diary of Captain R.R. 
Ross, a commander of one of the shore batteries, 
reproduced in the Confederate Veteran in 1896, wrote that 
driving back the ironclads was in itself a great victory. Ross 
made it a point to show that the ironclads had failed and 
been soundly defeated.97  
 The failure of the ironclads disappointed Grant, who 
wrote in his memoirs that though at first the enemy had 
been demoralized by the assault, after seeing them driven 
off, their “jubilant” response made him sad. He planned to 
pull back and entrench until the flotilla could get the 
necessary repairs in Cairo.98 General Floyd, however, had 
different ideas. On the night of the 14th, Floyd attempted a 
desperate breakout attempt, hitting the Union right. The 
Federals were able to hold their line but at the loss of an 
estimated 1,200 casualties. The next day, Grant ordered 
Major General C. F. Smith’s Division to charge the 
enemy’s right and then ordered a second assault by Major 
Generals John McClernand and Lew Wallace to commence 
on the enemy’s left.99 
 After the catastrophe of the ironclad assault, a 
demoralized and injured Foote had regrouped his flotilla 
downriver and was ready to drift back to Cairo for repairs. 
Grant, however, ordered any gunboats able should return to 
the fort and fire shells at a distance. Grant wrote that if the 
gunboats simply made an appearance during McClernand 
and Wallace’s attack, their presence alone could shift 
morale, save the reputation of the ironclads, and secure 
victory. When Commander Benjamin Dove, temporarily in 
                                                          
96 ORN 22:612. 
97 Confederate Veteran, Volume 4, 1896, 393. Digitized by Duke 
University. 
98 Grant, Personal Memoirs, 303-305. 
99 ORA 1, 7:159. 
Men and Machines 
 
49 
 
command since Foote’s injury, received the message, he 
perceived its importance and immediately took the St. 
Louis, the only ironclad left in an operable condition and 
returned to fire on the fort.100 That night, Brigadier General 
John Floyd, Pillow, and Nathan Bedford Forrest all broke 
out of the fort to avoid capture, leaving Simon Bolivar 
Buckner to surrender and sent a message to Grant 
requesting certain terms.101 Grant, however, replied with 
the now-famous phrase, “no terms except an unconditional 
and immediate surrender can be accepted,” forever earning 
himself the nickname “Unconditional Surrender Grant.”102 
 The descriptions of the ironclads after the Fort 
Henry and Donelson Campaign are perhaps the most 
interesting of all the documents analyzed. On paper, the 
ironclads were embarrassed, destroyed, proven to be 
vulnerable and able to be beaten. That, however, is not the 
story that emerged from the aftermath reports and 
recollections. Instead, if anything, the reputation of the 
ironclads only became more invincible as time passed and 
memories began to form. General Lew Wallace later 
recollected after receiving devastating news that all of the 
ironclads had been disabled, he was overjoyed to hear the 
sound of their guns just as his men were about to assault the 
Rebel line. Wallace said, “While my division was engaged, 
the guns of the fleet opened fire again. I recollect yet the 
positive pleasure the sounds gave me. I recollect thinking, 
too, of the obstinacy and courage of the commodore, and 
how well timed his attack was, if, as I made no doubt, it 
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was made to assist General Smith and myself…”103 
Returning to fire saved the “reputation for invincibility in 
the minds of both the national and rebel armies.”104 
 In these statements, Wallace helped to create and 
essential myth to the legacy of the Western Gunboat 
Flotilla. The Fort Henry and Donelson campaign is not 
remembered as a thrashing of the ironclads but instead as 
the triumph of Grant’s audacity and cutting edge 
technology. John Milligan has made the point that although 
Donelson proved the ironclads were not invincible, it did 
not matter; the psychological damage had already been 
done and the myth had been created.105  In his Memoirs of 
Service Afloat, Ralph Semmes treated the events of 
February 1862 as a foregone conclusion, writing: “When 
the enemy, by means of his gunboats, could send armies up 
the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, to the heart of 
Tennessee and Alabama, it was folly to think of holding 
Bowling Green, with our limited forces.”106  
 Analyzing the Western Gunboat Flotilla’s 
performance and legacy during the Fort Henry and 
Donelson campaign yields interesting insight into both 
Union and Confederate reactions to the advent of ironclad 
warfare. Born out of uncertainty and doubt, the ironclads 
became a symbol of the invincibility of Yankee industry, 
even when that notion was proven false at Fort Donelson. 
Gunboat technology was still in its infancy in the early days 
of 1862 and yet, despite the trial and error, the ironclads 
loomed larger than life. For some, such as Lew Wallace’s 
infantrymen, this symbol produced inspiration and pride. 
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For others, such as John Beauchamp Jones and Ralph 
Semmes, the ironclads came to represent industrialized 
Yankee villainy. The thrills and fears the ironclads on the 
Fort Henry and Donelson campaign inspired are far more 
essential to the understanding of ironclad legacy and 
memory today than their actual performance in the field. 
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